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Taking a second look at a classic work of your discipline is often a tricky business. At ﬁrstsight, it is almost impossible to avoid the impolite impression that some of its key ques-
tions are old fashioned and some of its answers trivial. This impression might in turn generate
a condescending attitude toward the author, which inevitably persuades us of our superior wis-
dom. But as the reading continues and the cultural context of the book delineates itself, it be-
comes increasingly clear that it is because of that book—and others of its ilk—that those ques-
tions have become old fashioned and those answers trivial. For a classic does not merely disclose
new mental spaces; it makes them look familiar, natural, and even comfortable.
Enrico Bellone’s Il mondo di carta is no exception.1 The book was published in 1976 by the
publisher Mondadori, based in Milan. Both the time and the place of its publication are mean-
ingful. Dominated for half a century by Benedetto Croce’s and Giovanni Gentile’s idealism, Ital-
ian philosophical culture was slow to react to the developments of philosophy of science. It was
only in the late 1960s that the ideas of logical empiricism—as well as those of its critics—made
their way to the academic world of the peninsula. Key to this process was Ludovico Geymonat.
A charismatic ﬁgure and an original thinker, Geymonat occupied the ﬁrst Italian chair in philos-
ophy of science at the University of Milan. During the social and generational turmoil of the
1970s, his multidisciplinary approach, blending logic, philosophy of the physical sciences, and
history of science within a Marxist framework, attracted a substantial group of young scholars eager
to break with traditional culture. More important, Geymonat, a mathematician by training, was
able to bridge disciplinary gaps and to recruit junior scientists who were looking for a career out-
side the lab. Enrico Bellone, who had just graduated in physics at Genoa, was among them.
The spirit of that pioneering period still emanates from the pages of Il mondo di carta. The
two introductory chapters are impregnated with the philosophical debates of those years. The
issues dear to Bellone’s heart are the defense of rationality against Paul Feyerabend’s methodolog-
ical anarchism, the search for a middle way between naive continuity and T. S. Kuhn’s drastic
incommensurability, the taming of Karl Popper’s methodological imperialism, the deﬁnition of
a role for history vis-à-vis Imre Lakatos’s provocative notion of rational reconstruction, and—per-
haps most important of all—the overcoming of the distinction between internalism and external-
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ism in history of science. At this point, more than one expert reader will raise an eyebrow. Do
we really need to beat those dead horses again? Haven’t we already disposed of them? When
we read Bellone’s book, though, we realize that we have not: we have learned how to live with
those questions, but they are still part and parcel of the historian’s practice. This is why Bellone’s
concept of the scientist’s dictionary still catches our attention as an intriguing insight. Like a par-
adigm, but unlike a methodology, a dictionary is something a scientist uses in her daily work,
not merely an abstract set of rules for selecting propositions. However, like a methodology, but
unlike a paradigm, a dictionary changes because of nature’s reactions to our investigations, rather
than because of a Gestalt switch. A dictionary includes scientiﬁc theories, methodological direc-
tives, epistemological and ontological presuppositions, computational methods, and many other
items arranged in an ever-changing, deeply interconnected network. Furthermore, a dictionary is
constituted by regions of uneven conceptual stability and diverse epistemological weight. Hence,
scientiﬁc change cannot be reduced to simple operations of adding, discarding, and replacing
propositions in the dictionary; rather, it is a continuous process of rearranging and realigning its un-
stable regions. More important, Bellone insists on the contingent nature of this process. Openly
targeting Lakatos’s methodology of scientiﬁc research programs, Bellone argues that precon-
ceived categories such as “mechanicism” cannot illuminate historical development because na-
ture gives “surprising answers” and scientists are, in turn, surprisingly ﬂexible in adapting their
theories.
Although it starts by challenging philosophical prejudices, Il mondo di carta ends up under-
mining historiographical ones. The book is concerned with the physics of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, a topic famously, and shamefully, neglected by historians of the discipline.
This lack of interest can be variously explained. From the point of view of the seventeenth cen-
tury, the physics of the Enlightenment represents a plain, albeit intelligent, application of the
revolutionary insights of Galileo and Newton. Kuhn, for one, marked this period as the proto-
typical example of normal science. Of course, nobody ever denied Laplace’s ingenuity or Lagrange’s
mathematical prowess, but the physics of the Enlightenment has always been refused the palm
of true revolutionary innovativeness. On the other hand, from the point of view of the twentieth
century, the concepts and values of so-called classical physics were often invoked in the stub-
born conservative resistance against relativity and quantum theory. Framed between two heroic
eras, the physics of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries frequently suffered dismissive judg-
ments of unfashionableness. Although in the last decades much historical work has stressed the
cultural impact of classical physics and highlighted its role in preparing the scientiﬁc revolu-
tion of the last century, studies on this period have remained comparatively scarce.
In the way it treats its subject matter, however, Il mondo di carta is a very unusual book. It does
not present a detailed discussion of theories, mathematical methods, and arguments—something
that Bellone had offered in other works, such as Aspetti dell’approccio statistico alla meccanica,
1849–1905.2 Even though clearly built on those works, Il mondo di carta has a distinct focus. It
zooms in on a handful of well-selected case studies to construct a general narrative of the mean-
ing of Newtonian mathematical physics for scientiﬁc culture at large. The central problem of
the book is effectively encapsulated in the title, Il mondo di carta—that is, “a world of paper.”
The title echoes a passage from the second day of Galileo’s Discourse Concerning the Two Chief
World Systems where Salviati states that “our discourses must relate to the sensible world and
not to one on paper.” This is a highly assertive statement that deﬁnes, at one stroke, the ontology
and the epistemology of physical theories. On the one hand, Galileo says that physical theories
ought to account for the real world of our sensible experience; on the other, he adds that math-
2 Enrico Bellone, Aspetti dell’approccio statistico alla meccanica, 1849–1905 (Florence: Barbera, 1972).
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ematics serves an ancillary role in this project—to wit, it allows us to know how our sensible
experiences are interconnected.
One of Bellone’s central points is that the developments of physics in the post-Galilean pe-
riod made this clear-cut distinction increasingly blurry. The emergence of analytical mechan-
ics, a process spanning several decades from Euler and Lagrange to Jacobi and Hamilton, brought
about undreamt-of mathematical tools that created completely new ways of looking at physical
phenomena. Bellone touches on this point when he discusses Maxwell’s preference for the La-
grangian formalism over the Hamiltonian one. Moreover, these new formal devices proved ex-
tremely powerful for dealing with a nature that was much more complicated and rich than pre-
viously expected. As Boltzmann showed in the early 1870s, statistics and Hamiltonian mechanics
are indispensable companions in the exceedingly complex task of describing the motion of count-
less colliding molecules. Analogously, the clariﬁcation of the relations between electricity and
magnetism—the former characterized by directionality, the latter by circularity—required the
elaboration of highly sophisticated mechanical models and the calculus of differential operators.
For Bellone, the consequence was almost inescapable: “When the awareness of the futility of
the opinions according to which the world appeared as endowed by the same structure in the in-
ﬁnitely small and inﬁnitely large came to maturity, the new physical sciences found before them
not only a world full of surprises, but also objective problems whose source was in the theories
themselves” (p. 165).
Although electromagnetism and thermodynamics—not by chance Bellone’s chief examples—
made apparent the role of mathematics in decisively shaping the ontology of physical theories,
the scientiﬁc world was not fully ready to bid adieu to common sense. The contraposition be-
tween Thomson’s and Tait’s natural philosophy and Boltzmann’s Bildtheorie, on which the book
hinges, turned out to be the supreme redde rationem of two centuries of mounting conceptual
tensions. Spurred by Boltzmann’s liberal use of mathematical abstraction, Thomson and Tait
felt moved to make a potent plea for the Galilean ontology: mathematics is useful, even indis-
pensable, so long as it remains an instrument and not a goal in its own right. The objects of phys-
ics are to be found in the sensible world—a conclusion that dovetailed with the glorious tradi-
tion of British empiricism. The plea would go largely unheeded, however. In fact, the following
century would witness the triumph of a physics increasingly detached from common sense and in-
creasingly attached to paper tools. Granted, the ontologies of the energy-momentum tensor and the
wave function are still ﬁercely disputed, but it seems safe to anticipate that they are nothing like
common tables and chairs.
In conclusion, among the several themes populating Il mondo di carta, the one that seems
to me still conspicuously with us is the issue of the ontology of physical theories. In contrast to
much contemporary philosophy of science, Bellone suggests that this issue must be historicized.
Galileo’s naive hope that the objects of physics could be effortlessly found in a transparent nature
was wiped out by the second scientiﬁc revolution. Instead, physicists put their objects together by
patiently combining experiences that are not mere givens, mathematics that is not mere instru-
ment, and rules of conduct that are not all-pervasive methodologies. Those objects live as much
in the world as in the stories that theorists tell about it:
The object Mars and the object caloric do not differ because the former can be pointed to
in the starry sky, while the latter cannot: as far as the object Mars and the object caloric are
concerned, the issue boils down to indicate a library of texts and memoirs on celestial me-
chanics and a library of texts and memoirs on the theory of thermal phenomena. . . . The
physical world and the objects belonging to it can be deﬁned as the collection, organized in
theories, of the propositions we use to discuss the world which we inhabit and which con-
strains us. Leaving to others the task to raise doubts on the existence of the objective world,
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the physical sciences ask reasonable questions about Mars or the caloric and interpret the
answers by means of zones of rules. The structure of questions and answers is historically
situated because the zones of rules are historically given and are modiﬁed by a historical
process that involves all dictionaries: an experiment by Vesalius and one by Millikan are
not historical examples of the absolute category of experiment as the Galilean explanation
of the free fall and the quantum explanation of the atomic structure are not historical ex-
amples of the absolute category of scientiﬁc explanation. In other words, historical processes
are not a repository of edifying examples. A theory of knowledge indulging in absolute cat-
egories would be nothing but a catechism in need of a false history. [Pp. 178–179]
Although this emotional afﬁrmation of historical ontology might seem to ﬂirt with Jacques Der-
rida’s deconstructionism or Michel Foucault’s archaeology of knowledge (and might be closely
reminiscent of the latter’s notion of “archive”), there is no such temptation at work here. Bellone
is not interested in dissolving the physical object into a conversational web. On the contrary, he
wants to point out that the ontological question, when examined through the lens of history, be-
comes an invaluable window on the dynamics of scientiﬁc concepts, practices, values, research
traditions, and cultural climates—a reminder that should not be lost on us.
The Logic That Governs Each Step
of Scientiﬁc Research
Luca Guzzardi
When it ﬁrst appeared in 1976, Enrico Bellone’s Il mondo di carta was another tile in thevast and multicolored mosaic of the growing interest of Italian philosophers and histo-
rians in the structure and development of the sciences.1 In the preceding decade, a group of young
scholars with a philosophical as well as a physical/mathematical background gathered around
the leading ﬁgure of Ludovico Geymonat, professor of philosophy of science at the University of
Milan. Beginning in the 1930s and 1940s, he had, on the one hand, introduced in the Italian
context some threads of Austro-German neoempiricism—mostly polemically, against the ideal-
istic tradition of Giovanni Gentile and Benedetto Croce and their tendency to place the natural
sciences under the patronage of philosophy. On the other hand, Geymonat’s education in philos-
ophy and mathematics enabled him to investigate concrete historical cases (such as Galileo or
the history of the calculus), thus combining epistemology with the history of physics and math-
ematics.
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